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I.  INTRODUCTION:  
COUNTER-INTUITIVE TRENDS IN AN ARMY AT WAR 
“[T]o care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, 




The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 catalyzed two wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.2 While combat broke Afghan and Iraqi military 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. 2009, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. 1997, United States Military 
Academy at West Point. The author commanded two companies in combat in Iraq and is a recipient 
of the Bronze Star and Meritorious Service medals. The author has experience dealing with the 
Army disability system, having been involved in several cases as a supervisor and having gone 
through the disability system himself. 
 1. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 
1865). 
 2. See Jennifer S. Martin, Adapting U.C.C. § 2-615 Excuse for Civilian-Military 
Contractors in Wartime, 61 FLA. L. REV. 99, 101 (2009) (“On September 18, 2001, Congress 
granted President Bush the ‘authori[ty] to use all necessary and appropriate force’ to combat 
terrorism in the Middle East.” (alteration in original) (quoting Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001))). 
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forces with relatively few American casualties,3 both wars devolved into 
protracted insurgencies. As of March 3, 2009, 3,854 American service 
members had been killed in action in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 While combat 
deaths are widely reported, the number of wounded service members is 
less visible but staggering nonetheless. According to the Department of 
Defense, 33,790 American service members had been wounded in combat 
in Iraq and Afghanistan as of March 3, 2009.5 
These statistics reveal that the wounded-to-killed ratio of soldiers 
serving in the Iraq and Afghan wars is approximately nine to one.6 A 
comparison of this ratio to past wars indicates that a much higher 
percentage of troops survive battlefield injuries today compared to only a 
few decades ago.7 The marked increase in battlefield injury survival can be 
attributed to a number of causes: improved personnel and vehicle armor, 
advances in medical technology and training, increased use of helicopters 
in evacuating injured troops, closer proximity of field hospitals to combat 
areas, and rapid evacuation of critically wounded soldiers to major 
hospitals in Europe and the United States.8  
While the increased soldier survival rate is welcome news, it has 
imposed a heavier burden on the military’s physical disability system. An 
increase in soldier referral through the disability system is logical under the 
circumstances, as many wounded troops are no longer able to serve. Thus, 
in 2001, there were 7,218 Army active duty and reserve soldiers referred to 
the disability system,9 while in 2005, after nearly two full years of war in 
                                                                                                                     
 3. The general terms “casualty” and “casualties,” as used throughout this Note, encompasses 
both military personnel killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA). The terms include 
neither deaths and injuries resulting from non-hostile causes, nor civilian injuries or deaths.  
 4. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Casualty Update, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Casualty Update]. Note that this website updates casualties 
regularly and unfortunately, the casualty figures reported on a given visit to the site will probably be 
higher than the figures listed on March 3, 2009. 
 5. See id. 
 6. The wounded-to-killed ratio is calculated by dividing the number of service members 
wounded in action by the number killed in action. See id. 
 7. Wounded-to-killed approximate ratios for previous wars are as follows: Revolutionary 
War—1.4:1; War of 1812—2.0:1; Mexican War—2.4:1; Civil War (Union forces only)—2.0:1; 
Spanish-American War—4.3:1; World War I—3.8:1; World War II—2.3:1; Korean War—3.1:1; 
Vietnam War—3.2:1; Persian Gulf War—3.2:1. U.S. Navy, Navy Department Library, American 
War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, tbl.1, available at 
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/american%20war%20casualty.htm (last updated July 13, 
2005). 
 8. See Thomas M. Beaver & Paul J. Schenarts, Battlefield Surgery 2005, 3 INT’L J. SURGERY 
171, 174–75 (2005). 
 9. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-06-362, MILITARY DISABILITY 
SYSTEM: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO ENSURE CONSISTENT AND TIMELY OUTCOMES FOR 
RESERVE AND ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE MEMBERS 38 tbl.6 (2006), available at 
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Iraq and four years of fighting in Afghanistan, this number totaled 13,748 
soldiers,10 an increase of more than 90%. 
Paradoxically, the number of soldiers who received permanent 
disability retirement benefits as a result of their referral to the disability 
system declined. After five years of war and a 90% increase in disability 
cases, the Army afforded disability retirement benefits to only 3.6% of 
soldiers referred for disability processing from January to August 2005, 
down from 10.5% in 2001.11 This decrease in permanent retirement 
disability ratings is almost 67%. 12 
 




                                                                                                                     
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06362.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT, MILITARY DISABILITY 
SYSTEM]. 
 10. Id. at 38 tbl. 6. 
 11. See GAO REPORT, MILITARY DISABILITY SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 50 tbl.14. Calculations 
made using only permanent disability retirees. 
 12. See id. at 9. Soldiers who separate from military service for medical conditions, but who 
do not qualify for medical retirement benefits, receive a one-time lump-sum severance payment, 
whereas retirees receive personal and family medical benefits as well as a small pension for life. See 
infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation of benefits resulting from 
physical disability ratings. 
 13. See GAO REPORT, MILITARY DISABILITY SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 50 tbl.14; id. at 38 
tbl. 6. 
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Moreover, not only did the percentage of soldiers deemed qualified as 
permanent disability retirees decrease from 2001 to 2005, the actual 
number of soldiers so rated also fell.14 In 2000, across all military 
branches, there were 102,000 disability retirees.15 In 2006, after five years 
of war and a 90% increase in disability cases, there were only 87,000 
disability retirees.16 
 
Figure 2:  Number of Soldiers Qualified for Permanent Disability 
Retirement (2001-2005)17 
 
These trends have not gone unnoticed by the media, veterans’ advocacy 
groups, or policy makers at the highest levels of government.18 Each offers 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See id. at 50 tbl.14; infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 15. Linda Robinson, Insult to Injury: New Data Reveal an Alarming Trend: Vets’ Disabilities 
are Being Downgraded, U.S. NEWS &  WORLD REP., Apr. 16, 2007, at 44, 46. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See GAO REPORT, MILITARY DISABILITY SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 50 tbl.14; id. at 38 
tbl. 6. 2005 statistics extrapolated using data available through August.  
 18. See, e.g., id. at 50; Ginger Thompson, Bush Calls for Simplifying Military Disability 
System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at A25; Ann Scott Tyson, Army’s Disability Benefit Review 














2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of Permanent Disability Retirements (2001-2005)
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different theories as to the cause of the downward trend of disability 
ratings, ranging from institutional or personal bias against injured or ill 
soldiers (especially those not injured in combat)19 to budgetary 
constraints.20 
Whatever the reasons for these trends, Congress, the media, and 
advocacy groups have generally acknowledged that there are problems in 
the disability system.21 “[S]ervice members often feel like they have to 
fight for a rating that accurately reflects their disability, i.e., the service 
they belong to and put on the uniform of acts as their adversary,” said U.S. 
Senator Carl Levin in his opening statement at a Senate Armed Services 
Committee hearing on military disability.22 “We simply have to do better 
than this.”23 
Numerous hearings, studies, and commissions have analyzed the 
military disability process. The most recent study came from the Veterans’ 
Disability Benefits Commission, jointly appointed by the executive and 
legislative branches to recommend reforms to the military disability 
system.24 In its October 2007 final report, the Commission made a litany of 
macro-level recommendations, which will no doubt help improve the 
disability system across the services.25 However, unless decision-makers 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Old soldiers say the root of the problem is an Army culture that preaches a “suck it up” 
attitude. “If you ask for what you are due, you are perceived to be whining or trying to pad your 
pocket,” says a retired command sergeant major. “If you’re not bleeding, you’re not hurt. That’s 
what we were taught.” Robinson, supra note 15, at 50. 
 20. “The total amount paid out for these benefit awards has remained roughly constant in 
wartime and peacetime, leading disabled veterans . . . to allege that a budgetary ceiling has been 
imposed to contain war costs.” Id. at 46–47. Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission Chairman 
Lieutenant General (Retired) James Terry Scott stated in testimony to Congress, “[The Department 
of Defense] has [a] strong incentive to assign ratings less than 30 percent so that only separation 
pay is required and continuing family health care is not provided.” Departments of Defense and 
Veterans Affairs Disability Rating Systems and the Transition of Service Members from the 
Department of Defense to the Department of Veterans Affairs: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Armed Servs. and S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of Lt. Gen. 
James Terry Scott, Chairman of Veterans’ Disability Benefits Comm.) [hereinafter Testimony of 
Chairman Scott]. 
 21. See Robinson, supra note 15, at 50 (“‘It’s hard to ignore the fact that in time of war they 
are giving out less disability. Is it policy? I don’t know. But it is a fact.’” (quoting Steve Robinson, 
Dir. of Veterans for America)). 
 22. Hearing on DoD and VA Disability Rating Systems & Transition of Service Members 
from DoD to the VA Before the S. Comms. on Armed Servs. & Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 
1–6 (Apr. 12, 2007) (opening statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
 23. Id.  
 24. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, §§ 1501–
1502, 117 Stat. 1392, 1676–77 (2003).  
 25. See generally VETERANS’  DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY: 
VETERANS’  DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  (2007) (making 
recommendations regarding improvement of the disability system for military personnel).  
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apply the rules to specific cases in accordance with administrative law 
principles and court decisions in disability cases, the reforms necessary to 
improve the military disability system are incomplete. This Note provides 
a legal framework to assist those decision-makers—the Physical 
Evaluation Boards (PEB), intermediate review officials, the Army Board 
for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), and legal counsel 
involved in the process—in making legally sufficient disability decisions. 
Part II of this Note explains in detail the Army disability process. Part 
III discusses case law and legal principles applicable to disability cases, 
recommends that PEBs prepare findings in accordance with the substantial 
evidence standard, and uses examples from the author’s own disability 
case to illustrate how the application of administrative law principles could 
lead to improved decision-making. Part IV summarizes the legal principles 
discussed in Part III and illustrates the importance of bottom-up reform. 
II.   A COMPLEX PROCESS: THE ARMY DISABILITY SYSTEM 
“At first glance, the disability ratings process seems 
straightforward. . . . But the system is hideously complicated in practice.”26 
Most law review articles dealing with the military disability systems focus 
chiefly on explaining the system because military lawyers, leaders, and 
soldiers alike simply do not understand the process.27 Thus, an explanation 
of the Army disability process is in order. First, it is important to 
distinguish the Veterans Administration disability process from the Army’s 
disability systems.28 By congressional mandate,29 the Army uses the 
Veterans Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities (VASRD) to 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See Robinson, supra note 15, 46.  
 27. See Thaddeus J. Hoffmeister, A Practitioner’s Note on Physical Evaluation Boards, 
ARMY LAW., Feb. 2001, at 49, 49; James R. Julian, What You Absolutely, Positively Need to Know 
About the Physical Evaluation Board, ARMY LAW., May 1996 31, 31; Eva M. Novak, The Army 
Physical Disability System, 112 MIL. L. REV. 273, 273 (1986); Chuck R. Pardue, Military Disability 
in a Nutshell, 109 MIL. L. REV. 149, 149 (1985). 
 28. See Army Board for Correction of Military Records [hereinafter ABCMR], Memorandum 
of Consideration, No. AC95-01533, at 3 (Nov. 25, 1998), available at 
http://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/CY1995/00000-13999/9508236.rtf (last visited Mar. 5, 
2009).  
There is a difference between the VA and Army disability systems. While both the 
VA and the Army use the VA Schedule for Rating Disabilities (VASRD) to 
determine disability ratings, not all of the general policies set forth in the VASRD 
apply to the Army; thus there are sometimes differences in ratings.  
Id.; see also Nat’l Coal. for Homeless Veterans, Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program: 
Understanding the VA and DoD Disability Benefit System Fact Sheet #1, at 2 (Mar. 2008), 
http://www.nchv.org/docs/VADoDFactSheet11.pdf.  
 29. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 1203(b)(4) (2009).  
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determine the degree of a soldier’s disability.30 But there are important 
differences between the VA disability system and the military services’.31 
The VA rates all of a soldier’s disabilities, even if those disabilities do not 
render the soldier unfit for military service.32 The Army, on the other hand, 
only rates and compensates for those disabilities that render the soldier 
unable to serve on active duty.33 Further, the Army and its sister services 
are not bound by the VA ratings.34 As one ABCMR memorandum put it: 
“The VA, operating under its own policies and regulation, assigns 
disability ratings as it sees fit. Any rating action by the VA does not 
compel the Army to modify its rating.”35 
The Department of Defense implemented its disability system under the 
authority of Department of Defense Directive 1332.18,36 pursuant to 
congressional authority granted in Title 10 of the United States Code, 
§ 1216.37 In turn, the Army promulgated Army Regulation 635-4038 to 
govern the administration of the Army disability system.39  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 30. The VASRD is codified by 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2008). The VASRD prescribes symptoms for 
a comprehensive list of potential medical conditions that correspond to a particular disability rating, 
ranging from 0% to up to 100%. Id. 
 31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 32. U.S. Army Human Res. Command, Army Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES), 
https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/Pda/ArmyPDES.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2009) 
[hereinafter USAHRC, APDES]; see also Robinson, supra note 15, at 49. 
 33. See Pardue, supra note 27, at 163. 
In order for a member to be discharged or retired from the Army for physical 
disability, there must be a determination that the soldier is physically unfit. This is 
so even if the member has serious physical impairments ratable by the VA or has a 
physical condition listed as a physical fitness retention standard under Chapter 3 
of AR 40-501. A member may fail to meet the retention standards of AR 40-501 
and have ratable disabilities of 100 percent disability from the VASRD, and still 
be found fit for duty and not receive any disability from the military. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 34. See Johnson v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 648, 650 (Ct. Cl. 1957). 
 35. ABCMR, Memorandum of Consideration, No. AC97-06529, at 3 (Nov. 10, 1998), 
available at http://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/CY1997/9706529.rtf (last visited Mar. 5, 
2009); see also USAHRC, APDES, supra note 32.  
 36. JOHN P. WHITE, DEPUTY SEC’Y OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.18, 
SEPARATION OR RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY  1 (Nov. 4, 1996), available at  http://www.dt 
ic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/133218p.pdf. 
 37. 10 U.S.C. § 1216(b)(4) (2006). 
 38. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REGULATION 635-40, PERSONNEL SEPARATIONS: PHYSICAL 
EVALUATION FOR RETENTION, RETIREMENT, OR SEPARATION i (Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter AR 635-
40], available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r635_40.pdf. 
 39. Pardue, supra note 27, at 150. 
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AR 635-40 outlines the military disability process and regulates its 
stages.40 The regulations first require evaluation and treatment of a soldier 
who has an injury or illness.41 A soldier may be referred for such medical 
evaluation by commanders of medical treatment facilities42 or field 
commanders.43 If medical evaluation and treatment reveal that the soldier 
is not fit to perform military duty because of a medical condition, then the 
medical facility will refer the soldier to a Medical Evaluation Board, or 
MEB.44 The MEB then evaluates the soldier based upon retention 
standards found in Army Regulation 40-501.45 AR 40-501 sets out medical 
conditions that “render a Soldier unfit for further military service and 
which fall below the standards required for [soldiers on active 
duty] . . . .”46 
If the MEB deems a soldier unfit for military service, he is referred to a 
Physical Evaluation Board, or PEB .47 Once a soldier is referred to a PEB, 
the Board’s first consideration is whether the soldier is fit or unfit for 
duty.48 Given that the MEB has already determined the soldier has a 
medical condition rendering him or her “unfit for further military 
service,”49 the requirement that the PEB determine fitness for duty is 
confusing.  
The difference between the boards is that the MEB determines fitness 
according to medical standards only, while the PEB then determines if a 
soldier’s medical condition prevents the satisfactory performance of his 
duty.50 According to AR 635-40, “[a]n unfitting, or ratable condition, is 
one which renders the Soldier unable to perform the duties of their office, 
grade, rank, or rating in such a way as to reasonably fulfill the purpose of 
their employment on active duty.”51  
                                                                                                                     
 40. AR 635-40, supra note 38, at i. 
 41. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-9, at 9.  
 42. Id. § 4-7, at 9. 
 43. Id. § 4-8, at 9. 
 44. Id. § 4-9, at 9. 
 45. Id. § 4-10, at 9. 
 46. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REGULATION 40-501, MEDICAL SERVICES, STANDARDS OF MEDICAL 
FITNESS § 3-1 (Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter AR 40-501], available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/ 
epubs/pdf/r40_501.pdf.  
 47. Id. § 3-3, at 21. The PEB is the most critical step in the Army disability process, as its 
findings generally determine the benefits to which a soldier is entitled. Id. § 3-4, at 21. Even though 
judicial appeals technically appeal the judgment of the Army Board for the Correction of Military 
Records, it is the PEB decision that is often the subject of that appeal, as the administrative appeals 
process within the Army rarely disturbs the PEB finding. See generally, e.g., ABCMR, 
Memorandum of Consideration, No. AC97-11215, available at http://boards.law.af.mil 
/ARMY/BCMR/CY1997/9711215.rtf (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). 
 48. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-19(d)(1), at 14.  
 49. AR 40-501, supra note 46, § 3-1, at 20. 
 50. See Julian, supra note 27, at 33. 
 51. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 3-5(c), at 6.  
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The PEB considers medical and performance evaluations in its 
determination, and either may be more probative to the fitness decision, 
depending on circumstances.52 A finding of unfitness cannot rest solely on 
certain effects that a medical condition may have on military service,53 
such as creating a failure to qualify for specialized duty, inability to deploy 
worldwide, inability to transfer between different components of the 
service, a lack of special skills in demand, or failure to meet initial medical 
entry requirements.54  
A condition that existed before the soldier entered the service will not 
be grounds for a finding of unfitness,55 even if the condition did not cause 
problems before military service.56 Further, there is a presumption of 
fitness if a soldier is retiring or separating through a process independent 
from the disability system.57 If applicable, this presumption is difficult to 
overcome.58 If a soldier is found fit for duty, he will return to his unit and 
perform duties in accordance with his medical limitations.59 
If the PEB finds a soldier unfit for duty, the board next assigns a 
disability rating,60 assuming all other criteria for eligibility for medical 
disability benefits are met.61 As discussed later, the PEB rates only 
disqualifying conditions62 using the VASRD.63 All other medical 
conditions, even if listed on the VASRD, will not form the basis of a 
disability rating from the Army.64 This point is vital to understanding PEB 
disability ratings.65 
                                                                                                                     
The decision of fitness is subjective. Soldiers performing duties may be found fit 
for duty, even though suffering from a serious illness or injury. Exactly what 
makes a soldier unfit varies not only among MOSs but also among soldiers within 
a particular MOS. For example, two soldiers, one an infantryman and the other a 
supply clerk, have identical knee injuries. The finding that the infantryman is unfit 
does not mean that the supply clerk, or even another infantryman with the same 
injury, also would be considered unfit. 
Julian, supra note 27, at 32. MOS stands for military occupational specialty—it is essentially a job 
description, such as pilot, mechanic, cook, infantryman, etc. Id. at 31. 
 52. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 3-1(c), at 3–4. 
 53. Id. § 3-1(c)–(d), at 3–4. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. § 4-19(e)(1)(a), at 15.  
 56. Id. § 4-19(e)(1)(b), at 15. 
 57. Id. § 3-2(b)(2), at 4–5.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Julian, supra note 27, at 32. 
 60. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-19(i), at 16–17. 
 61. Id.; see id. § 4-19(f), at 15–16; see also Pardue, supra note 27, at 155 (listing eligibility 
requirements to receive benefits under the Army disability system).  
 62. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § B-3, at 66. 
 63. Id. § 4-19(i), at 16–17. 
 64. Id. § 3-5(d), at 6. 
 65. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
9
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After finding the soldier unfit, the PEB then rates the severity of the 
disability according to the standards for each unfitting medical condition 
set forth in the VASRD, as modified for Army use.66 The percentage of 
disability helps determine the amount of compensation and benefits that a 
medically discharged soldier receives.67 If a soldier is rated at 30% 
disabled or higher,68 he receives a pension based upon the percentage of 
disability, years of service, and rank.69 Additionally, the soldier and his 
family continue to receive military health care and other benefits afforded 
to military members and retirees.70 If a soldier receives less than a 30% 
rating, then the soldier receives a one-time severance payment based on 
time-in-service and rank.71 
If the PEB assigns a 30% or higher disability rating to an unfit soldier, 
the PEB’s final determination is whether to permanently retire the soldier 
or place him on temporary retirement.72 If the PEB deems that the soldier’s 
condition is not stable, meaning that it could either improve or degenerate, 
the soldier may be placed on the Temporary Disabled Retirement List, or 
TDRL.73 A soldier may remain on the TDRL for up to five years,74 at 
which time he will be placed on permanent disability retirement, given 
severance pay for a disability rating of less than 30%, or declared fit for 
duty.75 During this period, the soldier receives all benefits as if he were 
permanently retired,76 but is required to undergo physical examinations and 
periodic PEB evaluations for the purposes of re-evaluation and final 
determination.77 After any periodic re-evaluation, however, a final 
determination may be made on a soldier’s case.78 
 
                                                                                                                     
 66. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-19(i), at 16–17. For an example of a VASRD rating for 
hypertension, see 38 C.F.R. § 4.104 (2008). See also EDWIN DORN, DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 
NO. 1332.39, APPLICATION OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION SCHEDULE FOR RATING DISABILITIES 
58–62 (Nov. 14, 1996), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/133239p.pdf. 
 67. See Robinson, supra note 15, at 46. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.; see also Pardue, supra note 27, at 166–67.  
 70. Pardue, supra note 27, at 167. 
 71. Id. at 169. The difference in value between severance pay for a disability rating under 
30% and disability retirement provides a powerful incentive for soldiers deemed unfit for service to 
seek the maximum rating supported by their condition. SeeTestimony of Chairman Scott, supra 
note 20 and accompanying text. At the same time, it provides a possible incentive for the Army to 
minimize such ratings. Id. 
 72. See Novak, supra note 27, at 279–80. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 280; see also AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 7-7, at 47. 
 75. Novak, supra note 27, at 280. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.; see also AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 7-4, at 47. 
 78. See AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 7-7, at 47; Novak, supra note 27, at 280. 
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The decisions outlined above are first made by an informal PEB 
board.79 The informal PEB records its findings and forwards the results to 
the soldier through a liaison officer, normally located at the soldier's 
military installation.80 At this point, the soldier must choose whether or not 
to concur with the PEB’s decision; if the soldier does not concur, he may 
demand a formal hearing or submit a rebuttal while waiving the formal 
hearing.81 
 If the soldier concurs with the findings, the case moves to the United 
States Army Human Resources Command (USAHRC) for final 
disposition.82 If the soldier does not concur and submits a rebuttal without 
requesting a formal board, then the PEB will respond to the soldier.83 
According to the regulation, “[w]hen the Soldier’s rebuttal does not result 
in a change to the PEB’s findings, the response will acknowledge receipt 
of the rebuttal and explain the PEB’s decision to adhere to the earlier 
findings.”84 Otherwise, the PEB will modify the findings in the soldier’s 
favor.85 The PEB may also modify results of an informal board when 
additional medical or other evidence necessitates such a change.86 
Non-concurrence and election of a formal hearing is more complex:  
While it is the soldier’s absolute right to request a formal 
board, there are certain hazards associated with having a 
formal board. The formal board is not bound by decisions 
made during the informal board process, as it is a “de novo” 
proceeding. Therefore, if the soldier elects a formal board, he 
may have his disability rating raised, lowered or maintained. 
In addition, the formal board may find the soldier fit and 
return him to duty or recommend further tests at the M[edical] 
T[reatment] F[acility].87  
This de novo standard is authorized by the regulatory language, “The 
[formal] PEB may change, modify, or correct its findings and 
recommendations at any time . . . .”88 After the soldier receives the formal 
proceeding’s findings, the soldier may concur in the results, at which time 
the case will be forwarded for final disposition, or the soldier may provide 
                                                                                                                     
 79. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-20(a), at 19.  
 80. Id. § 4-20(b), at 19. 
 81. Id. § 4-20(c)(1)(a)–(d), at 19.  
 82. Id. § 4-20(e)(1), at 20. 
 83. Id. § 4-20(e)(2), at 20. 
 84. Id. § 4-20(e)(5), at 20. 
 85. Id. § 4-20(e)(6), (f)(1)(b), at 20. 
 86. Id. § 4-20(f)(2), at 20. 
 87. Hoffmeister, supra note 27, at 50. 
 88. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-21(r)(2), at 25. 
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a rebuttal indicating his reasons for disagreeing.89 This rebuttal is limited 
to a few grounds, such as fraud.90 If the rebuttal does not spur a change in 
the findings, the PEB will respond to the soldier indicating the reasons that 
the decision of the formal PEB will stand.91 
If the soldier does not concur with the final findings of either the 
informal or formal PEB (as well as in other limited circumstances), the 
United States Army Physical Disability Agency (USAPDA) reviews the 
case.92 The USAPDA may revise the findings, concur in the result, or 
remand the case to the PEB.93 If the USAPDA concurs in the PEB’s results 
or modifies the findings and the soldier concurs, the case moves to the 
USAHRC for final disposition regarding the discharge or retention of the 
soldier.94 At this point, the Army Board for the Correction of Military 
Records (ABCMR) is the only universally available administrative 
recourse for a soldier or veteran wishing to appeal the Army’s decision.95 
This Board is extremely deferential to the Army’s decisions and rarely 
remands or overturns the decisions of the PEBs and their reviewing 
agencies.96 The filing of an appeal with the ABCMR is the last step 
soldiers take before suing in federal court.97 
III.   A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARMY DISABILITY DECISIONS 
Army disability decisions, whether at the initial PEB level or in a 
ABCMR final review, result from the application of regulations 
promulgated by the Department of Defense and the Army, pursuant to 
congressional authority. Thus, the decisions are subject to administrative 
law principles. This Part outlines relevant administrative law principles, 
beginning with an explanation of judicial deference afforded by courts to 
the services’ disability determinations. The analysis then turns to several 
cases that illustrate the limits of this deference. Finally, the author’s PEB 
case is used to illustrate how application of the legal principles set forth in 
this Part may have led to a different outcome.98 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Id. § 4-21(s)(1)–(2), at 25. 
 90. Id. § 4-21(t)(1)(a)–(c), at 25. 
 91. Id. § 4-21(t)(2), at 25–26. 
 92. See id. § 4-22(a)(1)–(7), at 26. 
 93. Id. § 4-22(c)(1)–(4), at 27. 
 94. Id. § 4-22(e)(1)–(2), at 27. Note that throughout the explanation of the Army physical 
disability system in this Note, there are myriad special circumstances that may result in alternate or 
additional procedures in a case at each of the administrative levels. These are not addressed as the 
intent of this Part of the Note is to provide a general understanding of the process as it applies to 
most soldiers.  
 95. Pardue, supra note 27, at 162. 
 96. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
 97. Pardue, supra note 27, at 162. 
 98. For the reader to understand the application of the legal principles discussed infra, it is 
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A.  Judicial Review of Agency Legal Interpretations 
The seminal case regarding review of an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of a statute is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.99 In that case, the Supreme Court set forth what has 
come to be known as the Chevron Doctrine.100 
When reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute, courts must first 
determine whether Congress has clearly spoken to the issue at hand.101 If 
Congress has spoken, courts must not adopt any other interpretation and 
congressional intent will control.102 To determine whether Congress 
expressed an intent regarding the statute, the court must first examine the 
text of the statute itself.103 If the statutory language is ambiguous, then 
courts should examine legislative history to glean congressional intent.104 
If the history and statutory text are ambiguous, and there is no explicit 
                                                                                                                     
necessary to establish the background of the author’s disability case. The author, a veteran Iraq war 
commander, was a U.S. Army aviator who was medically grounded from flight duties because of 
symptoms later determined to be asthma. He was denied career-enhancing reassignments, incentive 
pay, and was restricted from deployment and certain physical activities normally associated with 
duty. He was processed through the Army disability system, and an informal PEB found him unfit 
for duty with a disability rating of 10%. He then filed a rebuttal and requested informal 
reconsideration of his case, based chiefly on his prescription for daily asthma medication, which, 
according to the VASRD, qualified for a 30% disability rating. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.97 (2008). Upon 
reconsideration, the PEB did not address the issue appealed, the level of disability, but instead 
found the author fit for duty, precluding any need to address the disability rating. The author, faced 
with the same career restrictions as before his finding of fitness, elected to leave the service and 
received no benefits from the Army. The author does not imply that his medical condition is similar 
in severity to that of many brave servicemen and women who have been grievously wounded in 
combat, but it is his hope that this Note will assist the services in providing just disability decisions 
for these brave warriors. This Note is intended to be constructive, and is motivated by a genuine 
concern for the welfare of disabled veterans. Further, although the author discloses certain personal 
medical information for the purposes of this Note, he does not waive HIPAA protections beyond 
the scope of what is revealed herein and does not authorize the release of any medical information 
relating to his case without his express written permission.  The author maintains on file all relevant 
material regarding his case. 
 99. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a discussion of how courts have applied Chevron in other areas 
of the law, see Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our 
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 202–13 (2008) (discussing Chevron’s application to the 
SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule); Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Note, In Country, On Parole, Out of Luck—
Regulating Away Alien Ineligibility for Adjustment of Status Contrary to Congressional Intent and 
Sound Immigration Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 713, 722–26 (2006) (discussing Chevron’s application 
to agency immigration decisions). 
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 296–97 (2001). For a basic 
understanding of the Chevron Doctrine, see Dustin G. Hall, Note, Th  Elephant in the Room: 
Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 202–04 (2008). 
 101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 102. Id. at 842–43. 
 103. See id. at 859–61.  
 104. See id. at 862–64. 
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delegation of authority to the agency, the Chevron Court stated that 
delegation to the agency is implied.105 In any event, where a statute and its 
legislative history are ambiguous and there is either an explicit or implicit 
delegation of authority to the agency to interpret the statute, courts will 
defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable, and is not 
arbitrary and capricious.106  
In a subsequent case, United States v. Mead Corp.,107 the Court stated 
that the Chevron Doctrine’s high level of deference only applied where 
Congress intended for the agency to act with the “force of law.”108 If a 
court finds that Congress did not have such an intent, then the agency’s 
interpretation is subject to lesser deference under Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co.109 Federal courts have applied Chevron deference to the military’s 
interpretations of disability statutes.110 This deference comports with the 
language of Title 10 of the United States Code, § 1216(a),111 which gives 
broad authority to the military services to administer the disability 
system.112 Further, courts have applied Chevron deference not only to the 
services’ interpretations of statutes concerned with disability proceedings, 
but also to the services’ interpretations of its own regulations.113 Thus, 
while the military must follow its regulations,114 reasonable interpretations 
of military regulations receive extreme deference from the courts.115 
                                                                                                                     
 105. See id. at 865–66. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 108. Id. at 226–27. 
 109. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see id. at 140 (holding that agency actions are not controlling by 
virtue of the inherent authority of the agency, but such actions should be afforded deference 
commensurate with their thoroughness and consistency). 
 110. See, e.g., Sorrough v. United States, 295 F.2d 919, 922 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (per curiam) 
(stating that an Air Force regulation “establish[ing] the presumption that any disease contracted by 
a member of the Air Force while on active duty was incurred in line of duty unless there was 
substantial proof that the contracting of the disease came within one of several excepted categories” 
had force of law); Prichard v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 420, 422 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that 
Army regulations relating to compensation for service-connected disability were reasonably 
designed to carry into effect Acts of Congress and had force and effect of law). 
 111. 10 U.S.C. § 1216 (2006). 
 112. See id. § 1216(a). 
 113. See Wronke v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“If the applicable 
regulations are interpreted by the [armed services] in a reasonable manner, any charge of procedural 
irregularity must fail even though the [plaintiff] may present another reasonable interpretation of the 
regulations.” (citing Wronke v. Marsh, 603 F. Supp. 407, 412 (C.D. Ill. 1985))).  
 114. See Biddle v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 87, 95 (1968) (holding that the military services 
are bound by their own regulations).  
 115. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. But see John F. Manning, Constitutional 
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
612, 676–77 (1996) (arguing that deference to agency interpretations of the regulations it prescribes 
leads to vague and arbitrary results and opens up administrative policymaking to excessive interest 
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B.  Judicial Review of Agency Factual Findings 
Courts also give deference to agency determinations of fact. A federal 
court stated that “responsibility for determining who is fit or unfit to serve 
in the armed services is not a judicial province; . . . courts cannot substitute 
their judgment for that of the military departments when reasonable minds 
could reach differing conclusions on the same evidence.”116 Further, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof when seeking review of a military 
disability decision.117 Particularly for military disability cases, the 
reviewing court is limited to determining if the service’s decision was 
“arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to 
applicable statutes and regulations.”118 
This standard of review, oft cited in military disability cases,119  mixes 
two distinct standards of review pertaining to administrative decision 
making: the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Because the substantial evidence test is generally considered to 
be a more difficult standard of review for an administrative agency to 
withstand,120 it is difficult to imagine that a litigant would seek review 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,121 the Supreme Court construed 
the meaning of “substantial evidence” under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.122 The Court rejected the notion that an agency action was supported 
by substantial evidence if the “reviewing court could find in the record 
evidence which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board’s 
findings.”123 While substantial evidence review is neither de novo review, 
nor intended to countervail the expertise held by administrative agencies in 
making  decisions, “[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account 
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,”124 and “a reviewing 
                                                                                                                     
group influence). 
 116. Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted). 
 117. Rose v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 510, 512 (1996). 
 118. de Cicco v. United States, 677 F.2d 66, 70 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 
 119. See, for example, cases cited byBanerjee v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 522, 533 (Fed. Cl. 
2007). 
 120. See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 182, 186 (1935) (employing 
the arbitrary and capricious standard in ruling, where the agency made no findings of fact to support 
its action, that “where the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the 
presumption of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches . . . to orders of 
administrative bodies”); cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (holding 
that agency decisions must be supported by substantial evidence in light of the evidence contained 
in the entire administrative record). 
 121. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 122. See id. at 477.  
 123. Id. at 478.  
 124. Id. at 488. 
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court is not barred from setting aside a . . . decision when it cannot 
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is 
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety 
furnishes.”125 
The Court of Claims clearly applied the substantial evidence test in 
Jordan v. United States,126 reversing the decision of the ABCMR regarding 
Plaintiff's fitness for military duty. The court stated:  
Even though defendant’s evidence in the instant case, 
considered of and by itself, might support the administrative 
decision by the Army to discharge plaintiff as physically fit, 
we find, as hereinafter discussed, that there is “opposing 
evidence [principally, plaintiff’s medical record with the VA] 
so substantial in character” as to detract from the weight of 
the evidence in support of the Army discharge, and to render 
it “less than substantial on the record as a whole.”127 
Yet even the Jordan Court, while clearly applying the substantial 
evidence test, referred to the Army’s action as “arbitrary [and] 
capricious.”128 This language confuses the appropriate standard of review 
for military disability cases. Indeed, in other cases, courts, while purporting 
to use the substantial evidence test, appear not to actually employ it, 
instead showing extreme deference to the military services under an 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.129 
Given the great importance of arriving at correct decisions in military 
disability cases, PEBs and military review authorities should formulate 
their conclusions so that their decisions will satisfy the substantial 
evidence standard. Doing so will necessarily mandate a thorough and 
consistent depth of analysis in each case and lead to clear and well-
reasoned explanations of the findings.  
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. 
 126. 205 Ct. Cl. 65 (1974). 
 127. Id. at 73 (quoting Ward v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 210, 217 (1967)). It is interesting 
that a VA disability rating, while not dispositive, tends to diminish the validity of contrary findings 
by the Army under the substantial evidence test. Id. This ruling seems directly contrary to numerous 
ABCMR rulings that disregard VA evidence when reviewing PEB determinations. See, e.g., 
ABCMR, Memorandum of Consideration, No. AC97-06529, supra note 35; supra note 33 and 
accompanying text.  
 128. See Jordan, 205 Ct. Cl. at 84.  
 129. “To prevail under the arbitrary and capricious standard, plaintiff must demonstrate that 
evidence was ignored or unreasonably construed, or that designated duties were not performed by 
the AFBCMR. . . . ‘While the court might disagree with the board's decision, it cannot substitute its 
own judgment for the board’s if reasonable minds could reach differing resolutions of a disputed 
fact.’” Banerjee v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 522, 533 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (quoting Fluellen v. United 
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 97, 101 (Fed. Cl. 1999)).  
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C.  Limitations on Deference to Military Disability Decisions 
Federal courts, primarily the Court of Federal Claims, tend to defer to 
the decisions of the military services regarding disability.130 This 
deferential treatment, coupled with the burden of the plaintiff to show by 
clear and convincing evidence a defect in the disability decision, makes it 
difficult indeed for a soldier or veteran to prevail in an appeal of a 
disability claim.131  
Even so, a body of law demonstrates the outer limits of judicial 
deference. First, it is imperative that a military board articulate proper 
grounds for its decisions. The Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp.132 
held that the propriety of an administrative decision must be decided based 
only on the reasons given by the agency itself.133 
Further, even though an administrative agency is free to change or 
reverse course from a previous decision, the agency must provide a 
reasoned explanation for the change.134 Courts look unfavorably upon 
disability boards that change disability ratings in subsequent proceedings 
even though there is no change in the evidence.135 
                                                                                                                     
 130. “Judicial deference to administrative decisions of fitness for duty of service members is 
and of right should be the norm.” Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 131. See Colon v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 473, 484 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (stating that plaintiff 
“bears the burden of establishing by ‘cogent and clearly convincing evidence’ that the ABCMR’s 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law” 
(quoting Wronke v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986))); see also Dorl v. United States, 
200 Ct. Cl. 626, 633 (1973). 
 132. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 133. Id. at 196. A later case further explained: 
Normally, an agency [decision] would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered 
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, 
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make 
up for such deficiencies . . . . 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 134. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42. 
 135. In disapproving one disability board’s downward revision of a disability rating, the court 
stated: 
Just 6 weeks after an MB recommended retention on the TDRL, the PEB suddenly 
determined that plaintiff’s condition had stabilized, and that his condition 
warranted only a 10-percent rating due to the “improvement” plaintiff experienced 
while on the TDRL. As far as we can determine, this decision was based on 
exactly the same medical evidence as led the MB to conclude that plaintiff’s 
condition had not stabilized. 
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Another notable case, Beckham v. United States,136 held that a military 
service may not, because of a service member’s medical condition, move 
that person among multiple duty assignments until a job is found that the 
person can incidentally perform despite the medical condition, and then 
use that assignment to declare him fit for duty.137 The Beckham court 
stated: “[T]he [military] cannot shift an officer from assignment to 
assignment until a job is located that is not affected by the officer’s 
physical disability.”138 
Perhaps the most scathing reversal of a service’s disability 
determination by a court is Van Cleave v. United States.139 In that case, a 
pro se veteran filed suit against the government, alleging arbitrary and 
capricious decision making by the Navy PEB and Board of Corrections of 
Naval Records (BCNR).140 Plaintiff suffered debilitating headaches while 
on active duty in the Navy and, in 1997, was rated at 10% disability by the 
Navy PEB.141 Plaintiff accepted the findings of the informal board and was 
discharged with severance pay.142 
Subsequently, Plaintiff discovered that the PEB rated him based upon 
an incorrect diagnosis of chronic headaches rather than migraine 
headaches, and he petitioned the BCNR for upward adjustment of his 
disability rating.143 The Van Cleave court remanded the case to the BCNR 
for further review, noting that Plaintiff was not rated according to his 
actual medical condition, that the difference between a 10% and 30% 
rating was only the frequency of prostrating migraine headaches , and that 
Plaintiff’s rating may change based on the BCNR’s knowledge that 
Plaintiff’s headaches were, in fact, migraines rather than ordinary 
headaches.144 
On remand, the BCNR had found that the evidence did not reveal error 
or injustice in Plaintiff’s disability rating.145 The BCNR attacked Plaintiff’s 
credibility, stating that the diagnosis of his migraines was based on his 
subjective reports to his physicians, that just because he was prescribed 
medications for migraines did not mean that he required the medications to 
treat migraines, and that his real motivation for seeking discharge was 
because he was over the body-fat standards established by the Navy, a 
                                                                                                                     
Istivan v. United States, 689 F.2d 1034, 1037–38 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 
 136. 392 F.2d 619 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
 137. Id. at 623. 
 138. Id.  
 139. 70 Fed. Cl. 674 (2006). 
 140. Id. at 675–78.  
 141. Id. at 675. 
 142. Id. at 675–76. 
 143. Id. at 676. 
 144. Id. at 676–77. 
 145. Id. at 677–78. 
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condition that would have precluded his promotion and continuation on 
active duty.146 The BCNR further stated that his “habit of lying down in a 
dark room [during the] headache[s] d[id] not [establish] that the headaches 
were prostrating,”—part of the criteria for rating migraines—and also that 
a more “hale” individual would have been able to continue his duties.147 
The BCNR also used evidence of Plaintiff’s performance, namely his 
evaluation reports, as evidence that he was performing his duties 
satisfactorily, while simultaneously making veiled accusations of 
malingering, to support the position that Plaintiff did not deserve an 
increased rating.148 Finally, the BCNR attacked Plaintiff’s reliance on his 
disability counselor’s advice, stating “that plaintiff could not be believed 
because ‘[he] relied on a summary of the [PEB’s] findings provided by 
[his] disability counselor, a mess management specialist chief petty officer, 
whose normal duties prior to becoming a counselor probably consisted of 
cooking, operating a dining facility, and/or managing military quarters.’”149 
Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Court of Federal Claims, alleging 
bad faith on the part of the BCNR and also alleging that the BCNR’s 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.150 After stating that 
“[t]his court assumes the regularity of military records and the good faith 
of government officials,”151 the court went on to deliver a scathing eleven-
page opinion, holding that the BCNR’s actions evidenced bad faith and 
were per se arbitrary and capricious.152  
In its reasoning, the court stated that by making unwarranted attacks on 
Plaintiff’s credibility, toughness, and motivations, rather than addressing 
the issues raised by Plaintiff, BCNR failed in its mandate.153 Further, the 
court required the BCNR to satisfactorily articulate the reasons for its 
decision.154 The court pointed out that the record clearly did not support 
the BCNR’s findings, especially given the reasons the BCNR offered.155 
Additionally, the court offered several other insights applicable to other 
disability cases. First, it presumed that medication prescribed to treat a 
specific medical condition was convincing evidence that the service 
member required such medicine to treat the condition.156 Second, the court 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 678. 
 147. Id. at 678, 682, 684. 
 148. Id. at 685. 
 149. Id. at 683. 
 150. Id. at 678. 
 151. Id. at 679.  
 152. Id. at 684. 
 153. Id. at 679. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  
 156. “We are not aware that physicians routinely prescribe medications for ailments from 
which they think their patients do not suffer, nor does the record show that Mr. Van Cleave’s 
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inferred that administrative boards may not use personnel evaluations to 
demonstrate fitness performance while at the same time questioning, either 
directly or indirectly, the credibility of a service member to claim fitness or 
justify a minimal disability rating.157 Finally, the court rejected the 
government’s contention that Plaintiff’s failure to seek medical attention 
for headaches for a time indicated Plaintiff did not experience headaches 
during this period, especially considered in the light of medical treatment 
Plaintiff had received to cope with the condition.158 
These cases are only a sample of the body of law on military disability 
cases. Despite their varying facts, these cases provide a framework that 
military disability officials and their counsel may use to ensure consistent 
and legally sufficient disability findings. Application of these legal 
principles will improve the depth of analysis in disability cases and thereby 
also improve the outcome of disability decisions. 
D.  Application of Administrative Law Principles to a Disability 
Case 
The author’s case159 provides several issues that may be analyzed under 
the preceding legal framework. This analysis shows that thoughtful 
application of the law can lead to better disability decisions. 
First, in its initial informal consideration of his case, the PEB found that 
the author was medically unfit for duty and rated him as 10% disabled 
under the VASRD. The PEB reasoned that because the author did not seek 
emergency treatment for asthma attacks during a period during which he 
was not prescribed medication for asthma, he did not require the 
medication prescribed by his physicians. Under the VASRD, a soldier who 
requires daily medication for asthma is entitled to a 30% disability 
                                                                                                                     
doctors followed such a protocol here.” Id. at 680. 
 157. Id. at 685.  
The BCNR charged plaintiff with malingering throughout its decision, yet when it 
suited the Board’s purpose, it commented on plaintiff’s high standards of 
performance. Its purposes were to bring plaintiff’s “overweight condition” to the 
court’s attention once again; and to suggest that his migraine headaches must not 
have been severe enough to interfere with his performance. The Board managed to 
use even Mr. Van Cleave’s positive performance evaluations against him.  
Id.  
 158. Id. at 682–83. The court recognized that medical attention during the attacks was difficult 
and unnecessary. Id. at 683. 
 159. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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rating,160 which qualifies the soldier and his family for a pension, medical 
care, and other disability retirement benefits.161 
The author’s medical records reveal that physicians prescribed asthma 
medications for the author’s daily use to treat his condition, and his 
medical records contained annotations confirming that he required these 
medications. The PEB, however, concluded that not seeking emergency 
medical attention outweighed this evidence, even though emergency 
medical treatment is not a criterion for a 30% VASRD disability rating for 
asthma. The PEB based its rationale on the dubious premise that only 
persons who seek emergency treatment for a medical condition require 
medication for that condition. 
The PEB’s determination fails the substantial evidence standard under 
Universal Camera nd Jordan.162 Under this standard, “[t]he substantiality 
of [the] evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly 
detracts from its weight.”163 In the author’s case, the PEB disregarded 
uncontroverted evidence of the author’s requirement for medication in 
favor of a logically flawed rationale—the dubious premise underlying the 
PEB’s conclusion that the author does not need medication requires as 
much proof as the conclusion it supports. The Van Cleave Court addressed 
the military’s disregard of physician-prescribed drugs in disability cases.164 
“We are not aware that physicians routinely prescribe medications for 
ailments from which they think their patients do not suffer, nor does the 
record show that [plaintiff’s] doctors followed such a protocol here.”165 
Further, even assuming, arguendo, that there was a legitimate reason for 
the 10% disability rating assigned to the author, the PEB failed to articulate 
that rationale. Thus, under Chenery and State Farm, the decision in the 
author’s case cannot stand on the basis put forward by the PEB.166 
The author’s case also provides an example of a colorable issue 
regarding the PEB’s interpretation of Army regulations. After the Board’s 
initial determination of unfitness with 10% disability, the author, in good 
faith, requested an informal reconsideration and submitted a rebuttal 
arguing for an increased disability rating. The PEB reconsidered its 
previous decision and, instead of modifying or confirming its previous 
                                                                                                                     
 160. 38 C.F.R. § 4.97 (2008); see also ABCMR, Memorandum of Consideration, No. AC94-
05416, available at http://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/CY1994/00000-13999/9405416.rtf 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2009) (remanding a decision of the PEB and concluding that daily asthma 
controller medications necessitated a disability rating greater than 10%).  
 161. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 120–29 and accompanying text. 
 163. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). 
 164. Van Cleave v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 674, 680 (Fed. Cl. 2006). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
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disability rating, reversed its fitness finding, finding the author fit for duty. 
Implicit in this reversal is the PEB’s interpretation of AR 635-40, that 
the PEB has the authority, in an informal reconsideration, to reverse the 
finding of fitness where a soldier’s rebuttal only addresses a disability 
rating increase.167 In the case of a rebuttal submitted with a waiver of a 
formal board, AR 635-40 states that unless the Board changes its findings 
based on the rebuttal, it “will” state the reasons for adherence to the 
previous findings.168 In contrast, the portion of the regulation that governs 
formal hearings states, “[t]he PEB may change, modify, or correct its 
findings and recommendations at any time before the record of 
proceedings is delivered to the CG, USAPDA or Commander, USA 
HRC.”169 No such authority is prescribed in the portion of the regulation 
concerning informal reconsiderations.170 Under the maxim of construction 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,171 the absence of this authority in AR 
635-40 § 4-20(e) and its specific inclusion in § 4-21(r) lead to the 
conclusion that the only revision in an informal PEB reconsideration 
should be based on the soldier’s rebuttal. 
While AR 635-40 allows the PEB to change previous decisions outside 
a formal hearing, this power is only applicable when new evidence is 
presented that was not available to the Board during its initial 
consideration.172 In the author’s case, however, the PEB justified its new 
conclusion based on the officer’s evaluation reports, medical records, and 
physical profile limitations, all of which were considered in the PEB’s 
initial decision. 
Finally, notwithstanding the question of whether the PEB possessed the 
authority to revise its fitness finding in an informal reconsideration, the 
PEB’s revised factual determination that the author was fit for duty is also 
susceptible to critical analysis. Instead of addressing the author’s 
contention that he was eligible for 30% disability under the VASRD, the 
PEB reversed its own previous finding, made just two weeks earlier, and 
declared him fit for duty. While the PEB was authorized to reverse its own 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 169. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-21(r)(2), at 25. CG stands for Commanding General, 
USAPD stands for United States Army Physical Disability Agency, and USAHRC stands for United 
States Army Human Rescources Command. 
 170. Id. § 4-20(e), at 20. 
 171. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 538 (1990) (“[W]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of 
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))). 
 172. See AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-20(e), at 20.  
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decision, it must provide a reasoned explanation for doing so.173 The PEB 
made no attempt to explain its changed finding regarding the author’s 
fitness.174 
To support its conclusion of fitness, the PEB cited the author’s 
excellent performance evaluations and reiterated its conclusion that the 
author did not require asthma medication. In addition to the inadequacy of 
the PEB’s conclusion regarding the necessity for asthma medication,175 the 
remainder of the PEB’s explanation for its finding relied upon the same 
evidence it used to find a directly contrary finding just two weeks earlier. 
Courts look unfavorably on disability decisions that, without further 
explanation, change earlier findings based on previously considered 
evidence.176 
Further, under the substantial evidence test, the propriety of the PEB’s 
decision can only be determined in light of the entire record.177 While 
some of the evidence, namely a positive evaluation report, supports the 
PEB’s conclusion in isolation, the courts impose a higher standard.178  
In this case, the PEB disregarded evidence that the author, an aviator, 
could not pilot aircraft due to his medical condition and could not deploy 
to combat. This evidence seemed sufficient for the conclusion that the 
author could not perform the duties required of his military specialty.179 
Additionally, the author was moved to different positions twice due to his 
medical condition. As previously stated, a service may not move a person 
from position to position until locating a job that the person may 
incidentally perform, despite medical limitations, then use that 
performance as a basis for finding the person fit for duty.180 Finally, the 
author’s final evaluation report, though favorable, stated that he could not 
perform his duties as a staff officer because of asthma. On the entire 
record, it would appear that the PEB’s revised fitness finding was not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
                                                                                                                     
 173. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
42 (1983). 
 174. On June 2, 2006, the PEB stated, “The findings of the PEB are the Soldier’s medical 
and physical impairment prevents reasonable performance of duties required by grade and 
military specialty.” On June 16, 2006, after its informal reconsideration, the PEB stated, “Based 
on a review of the objective medical and personnel evidence of record and considering the 
physical requirements for reasonable performance of duties required by grade and military 
specialty, the PEB finds the soldier fit for duty . . . .”  The explanation given for the revised 
findings were based only on evidence available to the PEB in its June 2 determination. 
 175. See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 121–27 and accompanying text. 
 178. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478 (1951) (holding that an agency 
action is not supported by substantial evidence simply because “the reviewing court could find in 
the record evidence which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board’s findings”). 
 179. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 180. See Beckham v. United States, 392 F.2d 619, 623 (Ct. Cl. 1968).  
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IV.   CONCLUSION: REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM-UP 
This Note provides decision makers in the Army disability system a 
legal framework to guide their determinations. While it does not 
encompass the entire body of law on disability decisions or the myriad 
facts involved in individual disability cases, this Note shows that applying 
administrative law principles, including making decisions in accordance 
with the substantial evidence standard, leads to more sustainable and 
correct disability decisions. Even if most cases are correctly decided, there 
is no acceptable margin of error in the Army disability system, especially 
where improper decisions cause hardships for soldiers and their families. 
The twin purposes of the military disability system are to provide for a 
fit and ready force and to care for those soldiers who become ill or injured 
in the line of duty. Given general dissatisfaction with the recent counter-
intuitive trends of the Army disability system as described in Part I of this 
Note, there is no doubt that global reform of the disability system will lead 
to substantial improvements in the consistency and accuracy of the 
disability system. No amount of reform, however, will be effective unless 
the decision makers in the disability process have the tools to make legally 
sufficient decisions. 
To say a remedy is available in the courts for those unfortunate enough 
to have their disability case improperly adjudicated belies the reality that 
many soldiers, especially those who are physically infirm and financially 
burdened, may not have the means to litigate their claims. Rather, ensuring 
the maximum accuracy of decisions from the outset will alleviate the 
hardships that a soldier will incur as the result of an improperly decided 
case. 
Consider, as an example of these hardships, United States Army 
Sergeant Daniel Webb, who recalls his first back injury on a night infantry 
patrol in Iraq: “One minute, I’m standing; the next minute, I’m on the 
ground.”181 Sergeant Webb had fallen in a hole; he was given pain 
medication and continued the patrol.182 A week later, on another night 
mission, a wall collapsed on him, exacerbating his injuries.183 “It got to the 
point where I just couldn’t take it anymore. I felt like I couldn’t really 
walk, could hardly move,” said Webb.184 Sergeant Webb was found to 
have three herniated discs, but was not a candidate for spinal fusion; 
instead, doctors implanted a morphine pump to help him manage the 
chronic pain.185 
                                                                                                                     
 181. NewsHour: Veterans Struggle for Adequate Disability Compensation, (PBS television 
broadcast Jul. 23, 2007) (available at PBS Online NewsHour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ 
military/july-dec07/disability_07-23.html) (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/6
2009] POST-9/11 ARMY DISABILITY DECISIONS 663 
 
 The Army found Sergeant Webb unfit for continued military service 
due to his medical condition, but instead of rating his disability sufficiently 
severe to merit permanent medical retirement and the concomitant pay and 
benefits of such a status, he was given a 10% disability rating and a one-
time severance check of $30,000.186 Neither he nor his family has access to 
military healthcare or any other benefits.187  Webb’s attorney, who works 
with Disabled Veterans of America, maintains that Webb’s disability was 
severely underrated: “It’s a very bad decision for Sergeant Webb. His case 
has been terribly underrated. And the other bad news is that he is by no 
means alone. We’ve looked at this point at several hundred of these, and 
we have yet to find one that we looked at and we thought, ‘This was done 
right.’” 188 
 Sergeant Webb appealed the disability decision, but was unable to 
secure a higher rating.189 Instead, he moved his family from their quarters 
on base to a campsite until he could find affordable housing.190 
The importance of correct analysis in PEB decisions cannot be 
overstated. While some veterans have the opportunity, resources, and 
ability to overcome improper disability decisions, others are not so 
fortunate. For these disadvantaged veterans, even if they have the means to 
litigate the PEB decision and are successful, the reality is that they need 
benefits sooner, not later, to help them transition to a productive civilian 
life. The federal court system is not the appropriate venue for such a timely 
remedy. 
It is incumbent on all players in the Army disability system to redouble 
their efforts to stay abreast of developing administrative law principles, 
especially as they relate to disability decisions. Part III of this Note can be 
the starting point of that effort, and PEBs and legal counsel can use it to 
assist in the proper application of administrative law. Our soldiers deserve 
no less. 
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